Zouhir Gabsi

Tunisian youth: Demands for dignity in the context of challenging socio-political and economic upheaval

I. Introduction

Tunisian youths are a significant component of the Tunisian society. Demographically, youth in the age bracket of 15-30 years represents 30 percent of the total population.[1] This high number, or 'youth bulge,' puts pressure on the Tunisian government to cater for youths' needs and aspirations. The Arab Spring, which was ignited in 2010 by a youth named Mohamed Bouazizi, was an opportunity for Tunisians, mostly the young, to breathe the air of freedom after the two draconian regimes of Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

However, apart from the well-appreciated freedom of expression and association, the Arab Spring's anticipated promises were unmet, and the youth were among the losers. The sudden political thirst for democracy made Tunisia an arena for political infighting and corruption. Despite the youth's early engagement with politics, this led them to distrust partisan politics and made many, especially the uneducated, attempt clandestine migration in a desperate attempt to flee from unemployment and its attendant poverty and harsh conditions. But they end up, sadly, washed away on the shores of the little Italian island of Lampedusa. It is estimated that 56 percent of those in the 18-29 age bracket have considered emigrating.[2]

Such a dramatic state of affairs exposes the years of Tunisia's economic mismanagement and marginalisation of youth. Under Ben Ali's regime, Tunisia was considered a nation with an emerging robust economy, mainly by outside commentators. However, it was the regime's insidious manipulation of economic figures and data, especially youth unemployment figures, that presented a glossy image of the country.[3] Ultimately, Ben Ali's regime is not solely accountable for such conditions. It was the neoliberal model of the economy that had been imposed on Tunisia since the 1980s that left few opportunities for Tunisia to compete with the international 'free' market global economy making Tunisia – with its colossal debts – acquiescent to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank's policies.

Today, about ten years since the December 2010 revolution, the country's debts have not been utilised to benefit ordinary Tunisians. The infrastructure of Tunisia has worsened, and instances of corruption scandals have been reported daily on private television networks, coupled with many instances of violence and petty crime against vulnerable people, such as young women. Young people did not benefit from the Arab Spring, as one third of graduates are still unemployed where 40.8 percent are female graduates.[4] This has had a negative socio-cultural impact on the youth as the age at which to start a family has been delayed to their early forties. They wait for employment or under-employment opportunities that enable them to have a dignified existence. This period of waiting is referred to, ironically, as the "waithood" stage.[5]

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[1] Gabsi, *Tunisia's Youth: Awakened Identity and Challenges post-Arab Spring*, 2017.
[2] Arab Barometer V, *Tunisia Country Report*, 2019.
[3] Masri, *Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly*, 2017, 35.
[4] Bertelsmann Stiftung, *Tunisia Country Report 2016*, 2016.
[5] Dhillon and Yousef, *Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East*, 2009.

Tunisian youths' living standard expectations have changed with time, especially with the influence of globalisation. The needs and wants of a young Tunisian growing up in the 80s were vastly different from those of today's youth. Peer pressure to dress well, physical appearance and having the latest gadgets in the social context of a disappearing middle class and globalisation have put unbearable financial pressure on individuals and families. The division between the haves and the have-nots has never been greater, especially in the marginalised northern and western regions of the country. Most inhabitants of these forgotten regions suffer from unspeakable poverty and poor housing and infrastructure. There is an almost daily unfolding tragedy about people's experience and suffering. One such recent example is the death of a ten-year-old girl, who fell through an uncovered ground hole while collecting plastic bottles to help her mother earn an income.[6] The local council and the Ministry of Equipment, Housing and Infrastructure have blamed each other for the incident.

Before endeavouring to examine the Tunisian youth constituency, one needs to define what one means by 'youth'; is it merely a stage in one's life defined solely by age, or is it a social construction? The answer to that question lies with Pierre Bourdieu, the French sociologist and public intellectual, who sees youth as a social construct, since depicting youth with a broad stroke solely based on age is not only dangerous because it excludes other youths, but it does not account for the individualisation and social generations of youth. The latter are defined not by age, but by shared social, economic and political experience.[7] Young people's experiences are also determined according to gender, age, race and class; but the social generation

perspective sees youth across the globe as experiencing different but similar outcomes. According to Woodman and Wyn, the social generation perspective helps to follow how opportunities have been formulated and confirmed through time.[8]

Hence, the Tunisian youth constituency, as in many parts of the world, is not homogenous. In sociological terms, there is a continuum with its specific variables such as class, the underclass, religiosity, urban or rural location and the significance of cultural capital in shaping the youth's upbringing and prospects. In terms of religiosity, there are youths who are non-practising, secular, fundamentalist, Sufi and Salafist. Therefore, one needs to consider all of these variables in discussing youth so that the analysis can be more encompassing and inclusive. This article aims to discuss the factors affecting the socio-political makeup of Tunisian youth and whether, a decade since the revolution; the Tunisian youth have reaped the fruit of the revolution. It will address Tunisia's economic and political situation, which is directly linked to the youth's political identity. The article also discusses the youth's hybrid identity, resulting from the impact of the "glocal" culture facilitated by the "Facebook-isation" of Tunisia, where youth have been drawn to social media platforms for political dissent and escapism.

II. Tunisia, liberal democracy and neo-liberalism

Tunisia has attempted to embrace the ethos of liberal democracy with limited success. Although positive outcomes have been achieved through the Western style of liberal democracy, such as a low rate of poverty in Tunisia, which has dropped from 20.1 percent

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[6] Barakat, *ḥāditha suqūṭ ṭiflah bi-qanāt lil ṣarfa al ṣiḥḥi tašghul al raʾy alʿām bi-Tūnis (The Accident of a Child Falling into a Sewage Canal Occupies Public Opinion in Tunisia)*, 2020.

[7] Pruitt, *Youth, Politics, Participation in a Changing World*, 2017.

[8] Woodman and Wyn, *Youth and Generation: Rethinking Change and Inequality in the Lives of Young People*, 2015.

[9] The World Bank, *Tunisia Poverty Assessment 2015*, 2016.

in the 1980s to 4.1 percent in 2000,[9] the real growth has benefited mainly the country's more urbanised cities.[10] The neoliberal model of economy imposed on Tunisia in the 1980s has had devastating sociological and economic effects. However, it is not the sole reason for the disengagement of youth. According to Francis Fukuyama, "contemporary liberal democracies have not solved the problems with thymos (soul) – the part of the soul that craves recognition of dignity."[11] The demand for dignity was one of the main drivers of the Arab Spring. Bouazizi's self-immolation in December 2010 after the confiscation of his cart by the local police was a desperate plea for recognition. The authorities' refusal to account for the seizure of his vegetable cart was interpreted by Bouazzi as the annulment of his identity as a human. He felt insignificant, a feeling that fuelled and mobilised protests and sit-ins, not just in Tunisia, but also in other Arab countries.

The title of an article published in *The Guardian*, "Neoliberals, not Islamists, are the real threat to Tunisia," also identified the neoliberal model as the cause of the worsening of Tunisia's economic situation.[12] This view has been adopted by many Arab Spring commentators.[13] However, as stressed earlier, neoliberalism cannot bear sole responsibility for Tunisia's dysfunctional economy. The extent and gravity of the corruption of politicians and Tunisian institutions is undeniable. When young people experience corruption and nepotism, mostly as unemployed graduates, the feeling of resentment increases. They are further alienated from the state, which "was supposed to

uphold the social contract with its citizenry but instead allowed the plundering of the country's riches by a small clique."[14] The youth's sense of disengagement was shown in the spring of 2013, when almost half of the unemployed youth had given up seeking work and 94 percent were registered with their local employment office.[15] The high number of unemployed youth is often attributed to the term 'youth bulge,' a term that has been 'twisted' to serve the ideological purposes of the US Central Intelligence Agency to ensure that implementing measures such as birth control in the MENA region works in favour of Western powers.[16] Youth apathy towards the political situation in Tunisia heralds socio-cultural and political realities.

III. Tunisian youth: Politics and socio-cultural realities

Youth protests have gone through two phases; the 2010-2011 protests differ from those occurring post-2011. In the former, the youth demanded recognition and dignity, while in the latter they demanded answers to general socio-economic grievances. This is echoed in the new slogans: "the people are tired, the new Trabelsi are here," "the people want a new revolution," "*dégage!*" (go away!), "the revolution has been stolen, where is the revolution?".[17] In Hamid Dabashi's words, "the Arab Spring has altered the very DNA of the region's geopolitics".[18] The Tunisian youth realised in 2011 that an ageing parliament and a coalition of Nidaa Tunis and al-Nahdha had hijacked their revolution. With these two in power, the youth were driven back into the margins of society despite attempts

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[10] Gabsi, *Tunisia's Youth: Awakened Identity and Challenges post-Arab Spring*, 2017.

[11] Ibid. 5.

[12] Kennard, *Neoliberals, not Islamists, are the Real Threat to Tunisia*, 2012.

[13] Temimi, *Symposium on Youth*, 2012; Kaboub, *The End of Neoliberalism? An Institutional Analysis of the Arab Uprisings*, 2013; Kalaycioglu, *The European Union and Neoliberal Governmentality: Twinning in Tunisia and Egypt*, 2015; Gabsi, *Tunisia's Youth: Awakened Identity and Challenges post-Arab Spring*, 2017.

[14] Honwana, *Youth and Revolution in Tunisia*, 2013.

[15] Ben Hafaiedh William, *Tunisia: Beyond the Ideological Cleavage: Something Else*, 2015.

[16] Achcar, *The People Want: A Radical Exploration of The Arab Uprising*, 2013.

[17] Santinti, *Limited Statehood in Postrevolutionary Tunisia Citizenship, Economy and Security*, 2018, 48.

[18] Dabashi, *The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism*, 2012, 228.

by civil society organisations (CSOs) to woo them back to the political arena through incentives such as participation in international conferences, which somewhat reduced their marginalisation. The CSOs' activities "revolve around democratisation and focus on ideas and practices of citizenship as a set of social, political, and economic rights and duties."[19] These civil societies, through external funding and tutelage, encourage and foster the youth's ability to be potential business people and ingrain in them Western values of democracy and pluralism.[20]

Youth engagement with international bodies hinges on economic concerns for three reasons.[21] The first reason is apparent, as youths need this international exposure to seek funding to support their entrepreneurial projects. The second reason deals with their lack of faith in the state, where decision-making is still in the hands of economic giants who have excluded young people in the past. The third reason concerns the feeling of abandonment, intensified by a debilitated economy and socio-economic inequality. The state's response to address the disengagement of these youths is through policing; this encourages youths to adopt the extreme rhetoric of the Islamic State, which "is not necessarily gaining ground as an alternative religious imagination but as what may feel like the only chance for integration into a collective."[22] Despite the CSOs' attempts to alleviate the plight of the Tunisian youth, their efforts fall short of helping the majority of youths still chained to the NEET acronym (Not in Education, Employment or Training). CSOs'

motto of youth capacity-building has been proven to be uninclusive, as "it focuses primarily on selected urban youths who claim to speak on behalf of the majority, including the uneducated, under-class, and rural youths."[23]

Changes in youth attitudes to politicisation reflect a new consciousness elicited and influenced by globalisation. Due to its inherent openness, globalisation has helped Tunisian youths to share views and new political realities. However, the homogeneity of globalisation has also contributed to the creation of new identities detached from local communities.[24] A nation's most important components, in terms of political identity, are found in language and culture.[25] It is sharing common human history, culture and language that defines the formation of identities.[26] However, research into Tunisia's youth identity constituency has received uneven attention. While some researchers have focused on Salafism in Tunisia, with a plethora of studies on the subject, only a few studies have concentrated on youth identity and exclusion. Most of this research emanates from projects by Carolina Viviana Zuccotti et al. (Food and Culture Association), and others funded by some European institutes.[27] These reports offer solutions to encourage Tunisian youths' active citizenship and meet demands for more inclusive policies. However, the World Bank, along with the EU, IMF, US and the UN, ironically promote the neoliberal agenda, and are "strong supporters and financers of neoliberal policies and economic adjustment programs implemented by the Tunisian and

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[19] Boutieri, *Jihadists and activists: Tunisian youth five years later*, 2015, para.12.

[20] Ibid. para. 29.

[21] Aydogan and Yildirim, *The Economic and Political Dissatisfaction behind Tunisia's Protests*, 2018.

[22] Ibid. para. 39.

[23] Gabsi, *Tunisian Youth as Drivers of Socio-Cultural and Political Changes: Glocality and Effacement of Cultural Memory?*, 2020.

[24] Woodward, *Identity and Difference*, 1997.

[25] Herder, *Herder on Social and Political Culture*, 1969.

[26] Poole, *Nation and Identity*, 1999.

[27] Zuccotti et al., *Rural Migration in Tunisia: Drivers and Patterns of Rural Youth Migration and its Impact on Food Security and Rural Livelihoods in Tunisia*, 2018; Kamel and Seli, *Realizing Youth Potential in the Mediterranean Unlocking Opportunities*, 2018.

Egyptian governments since the 1980s."[28] These economic programmes do not take account of certain realities and are therefore oblivious to problems such as corruption, to which Tunisia loses an annual USD 3bn.[29]

With a frail economy worsened by political infighting and corruption, young Tunisians have searched for ways to escape these harsh realities, and have turned *en masse* to social media platforms such as Facebook to express their political dissidence and recourse for space and escapism. They have acquired a culture of their own, a hybrid culture, which is considered one of the new manifestations of the Tunisian youth.

IV. Tunisian youth and cultural hybridity

In attempting to understand Tunisian youth, early studies fail to consider the youth's identity, intergenerational conflict and the psychological pressures that result from globalisation and a changing world. I have explored previously how Tunisian youths have experienced a political awakening enhanced by the freedom of expression and association.[30] This awakening was short-lived and subdued by political infighting, and did not fulfil the promises of the revolution. Some informants have expressed their frustration and dismay with the revolution, stating that Tunisia, for them, is only a "geographical place," and that on each day "one wakes up with a good dream that dies by sunset."[31] The youth's daily challenges range from the absence of essential commodities such as public transport, and the diminishing purchasing power. However, my research has surveyed mainly university

students, representing one small constituent; the unskilled, the uneducated and those belonging to the under-class are left voiceless.

The urban and rural youth divide in social, economic, and political terms became more apparent in post-Arab Spring Tunisia. Tunisia's north-western and southern regions have endured unfair distribution of the country's resources and infrastructure, and have suffered marginalisation and social exclusion. The old regime and current government still favour the urban, the northern and eastern sides of the country and remain oblivious to the rest of the country. This divide became the topic of rap music; for instance, Balti, a Tunisian rapper, sang about rural migration to the capital city Tunis and stated that "when I was young, I thought, we don't exist on the map [of Tunisia]".[32] Most rural youths, mainly men, had no choice but to migrate to major cities to seek work and to further their studies. This migration not only creates a disequilibrium in the male-to-female ratio, which negatively affects marriage prospects, but they also often face harsh economic and social discrimination, mainly due to their accent and place of origin.[33]

Political commentators who claim that the Tunisian youth are disinterested in partisan politics are overstating the case. Although their views do not translate into electoral results, they are expressed mainly in social circles like the family, friends, social media and cafés. The lack of having or being given a voice parallels the frustrations expressed by Bou Azizi and others, that they are not treated like humans in what is perceived as a patriarchal society where children cannot

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[28] Işleyen, *The European Union and Neoliberal Governmentality: Twinning in Tunisia and Egypt*, 2015, 674.

[29] Al-Hamidi, *Tunis: 3 Milyaraat dollar khasair sanawiyyah bisabab al-fasaad (Tunisia: $ 3 billion in annual losses due Corruption)*, 2020.

[30] Gabsi, *Tunisia's Youth: Awakened Identity and Challenges post-Arab Spring*, 2017.

[31] Ibid. 14.

[32] Gabsi, *The Language of Hip Hop and Rap in Tunisia: Sociocultural Mirror, Authenticity Tool, and Herald of Change*, 2020.

[33] In my fieldwork visits to the southern region, especially the remote Berber towns of Chninni and Douiret, many of the young women in the late 30s and early 40s expressed their desire to get married and have a family, but opportunities for finding prospective partners are rare due to the migration of men to the major cities.

express themselves or participate in discussions in the presence of adults. This perception needs to be qualified with further research into the structure of the Tunisian family unit. The Tunisian educational system, especially at the secondary level, does not foster critical thinking in the same way as it is practised in the West.

Religiously, Tunisian youths show interesting and wide variations in Islamic practices, attitudes and knowledge of the foundations of the Islamic faith. On the spectrum of belief, there are youths who consider themselves as Muslims by culture, moderates, fundamentalists and Salafists. Salafism is the most studied form of religiosity. It has been described as "a tidal wave that crashed into Tunisia from the Wahhabi Gulf without warning".[34] A Tunisian Salafi in Tunisia adopts a radical way of life and interpretation of post-seventh century Islam, shunning other *madhāheb* (legal schools) to be connected directly with the *al-salaf al-sālaḥ* (the righteous or pious ancestors).[35] The Tunisian Salafi is often depicted as someone who wears a *thawb* (robe), uses the Islamic greeting and is apathetic towards politics.

Most Salafists reside in impoverished areas, such as Bab al Khadhra, Sidi Bouzid, Kairouan, Sajnan and Menzel Bourguiba. The marginalisation of youth is not solely linked to poverty and lack of formal education, as many Salafists are educated and belong to the upper-middle class.[36] Jihadi Salafists found a niche among disenfranchised youths because the latter were frustrated with the state's hypocrisy, "centralized state power,

and an older generation of political leaders perceived as largely incompetent and neglectful."[37] By rejecting even the Muslim party, they are creating their own subculture, which "represents an almost anarchist haven for youths who wish to stand out from the pack, quickly circumvent institutionalized obstacles and upend longstanding hierarchies".[38]

Culturally, combining the local with the global relies heavily on technology in the media environment. However, technology itself does not account for youth behaviour. Numerous past scholars have treated media content as a type of injection or as a cultivation tool, used to explain behaviour.[39] The cultivation concept explains how media content creates its own mythology on various topics, such as women or crime, which forms people's views and reactions to their own social circumstances.'[40] Globalisation supports international markets, which contribute to a borderless world but can be detrimental to state power.[41] According to Hasan Kosebelaban, there is often a lack of discussion on the effect of globalisation on social relations and social identities.[42] Globalisation becomes a process in which social relations become "less tied to territorial frameworks,"[43] and "territorial distance and territorial borders hold limited significance in these circumstances: the globe becomes a single 'place' in its own right".[44]

Hence, globalisation moves the existing relations between states to a different level, where the societal forces within every state communicate with each other on a global scale.[45] Aided by globalisation, national politics can spill out to the international arena,

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[34] Marks, *Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current*, 2013, 107.

[35] Ibid. 108.

[36] Ibid. 110.

[37] Marks, *Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current*, 2013, 111.

[38] Ibid. 111.

[39] Meyrowitz, *No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behavior*, 1985, 15.

[40] Ibid. 15.

[41] Kosebalaban, *The Impact of Globalization on Islamic Political Identity: The Case of Turkey*, 2005, 28.

[42] Ibid. 28.

[43] Scholte, *Global Capitalism and the State*, I997, 431.

[44] Ibid. 431.

[45] Kosebalaban, *The Impact of Globalization on Islamic Political Identity: The Case of Turkey*, 2005, 28.

which may "infect international politics."[46] That is to say, identity may be shaped positively or negatively by globalisation. On the one hand, it may expand an individual's consciousness to become part of the global village, or it may work conversely by expanding political boundaries and enhancing political conflicts and regional instabilities.[47]

V. Youth politics in comparative perspective

Youth disengagement and apathy towards politics has been observed and well researched in various countries, such as the UK, US and Australia.[48] In the US, a considerable study involving 4,000 high school students, conducted by Jennifer L. Lawless and Richard L. Fox, reveals that most young people were disinterested in politics because of their lack of trust in public officials.[49] However, this lack of interest in politics does not help them to achieve social change, which occurs through electoral politics, which helps them to have a future.[50] The students blamed politicians for their selfish and corrupt behaviour. In the Australian context, young people's disengagement is affected by the high degree of polarisation in politics and by politicians' behaviour.[51] Additionally, young people are averse to expressing political positions as a consequence of the digital age, where digital fingerprints cannot be easily removed, and because of the lack of privacy. Both

Mats Ekström and Lawless and Fox concur that young people find social media such as Facebook an unsafe environment to post controversial statements for fear of face-to-face confrontations.[52]

Youth democratic engagement is also viewed through the lens of political talk, which is linked to the youth's civic commitment.[53] Political talk takes different trajectories and contexts when occurring in families, online and on social media such as Facebook. It is worth emphasising that political talk is "understood as a social achievement, related to the exploration, disclosure, and management of self-identities in various social settings and relationships."[54] However, even though political talk is a realisation of democracy, it is still clouded by apprehension and fear of losing social values, especially in public settings.[55] That fear is reduced drastically when youths are engaged in political discussions with their peers and family, because they develop new roles and political self-identities and self-reflections not found when involved with other political organisations.[56] The youth find that the political discussions on social media platforms threaten rather than confirm their self-identity.[57] This is mainly evident when expressing controversial opinions that can be easily manipulated and misinterpreted, and misunderstanding becomes difficult to amend.[58]

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[46] Ibid. 28.

[47] Ibid. 28.

[48] Bennett, Wells and Rank, *Young Citizens and Civic Learning: Two Paradigms of Citizenship in the Digital Age*, 2009; Vromen, *Constructing Australian Youth Online*, 2011; Chou, *Democracy's Not for Me: The Lowy Institute Polls on Gen Y and Democracy*, 2013; Collin, *Young Citizens and Political Participation in a Digital Society: Addressing the Democratic Disconnect*, 2015; Lawless and Fox, *Running from Office: Why Young Americans Are Turned Off to Politics*, 2015; Ekström, *Young People's Everyday Political Talk: A Social Achievement of Democratic Engagement*, 2016; Pruitt, *Youth, Politics, Participation in a Changing World*, 2017.

[49] Lawless and Fox, *Running from Office: Why Young Americans Are Turned Off to Politics*, 2015.

[50] Pruitt, *Youth, Politics, Participation in a Changing World*, 2017, 511.

[51] Oliver, *Lowy Poll on Gen Y and Democracy: What's Going On?*, 2013.

[52] Ekström, *Young People's Everyday Political Talk: A Social Achievement of Democratic Engagement*, 2016; Lawless and Fox, *Running from Office: Why Young Americans Are Turned Off to Politics*, 2015.

[53] Ekström, *Young People's Everyday Political Talk: A Social Achievement of Democratic Engagement*, 2016, 1.

[54] Ibid. 2.

[55] Ibid. 3.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

Authors have different approaches to fostering youth engagement, reducing the youth's apathy towards politics and increasing their active citizenship and role in society. For instance, Philippa Collin suggests that youth participation policies need to expand based on multiplicity and pluralism, changes to political institutions and more youth advocacy.[59] Other authors provide futile quick-fix solutions, such as creating phone applications like "PlayStation for politics" and a "GoRun" to encourage young voters.[60] Without recourse to these quick fixes, the Tunisian youth could become more involved in politics if they experience government transparency and trust; only then can the youth feel propelled to be involved in formal politics. As stated by Lesley Pruitt, "[y]oung people are not lazy, apathetic, or disconnected from social change. Rather, many youth aspire to leadership and making positive changes to their communities and the world".[61]

VI. Conclusion

This article is a short critique of the achievements and trials of Tunisia's youth in post-Arab Spring Tunisia. Almost a decade since the beginning of the 2010 Arab Spring, the Tunisian youth have appreciated the freedom of expression brought by the revolution. However, the revolution did not deliver on its promises to the Tunisian people to offer dignified living standards and create employment opportunities for Tunisia's biggest human asset – its young constituency. Instead, Tunisia's political and socio-cultural situation has been worsened by the political infighting, corruption and increase in violence, which have obstructed Tunisia's vision to improve the livelihoods of its people.

This article demonstrates that most youth – based on empirical surveys – have expressed a grim outlook on Tunisia's current socio-economic situation, and express a neutral attitude towards partisan politics; their shunning of political participation is mirrored in their lack of support for political campaigns, and ultimately in the voting process. If Tunisia wants to extricate itself from the problems it is facing today, it needs to reengage with its young population. Failure to do this will further drive the youth into the margins of the society, towards idleness and the concomitant violence and despair. Once the government integrates youth into its operational planning, young Tunisians – with their thirst for progress and success – could be the driving force behind a robust economy, unfettered from the reigns of the neoliberal model, and from the weight of international debt. Tunisia needs to reflect inwardly, refocus its vision on its natural and human assets, and utilise these to benefit the country.

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[59] Ibid.
[60] Pruitt, *Youth, Politics, Participation in a Changing World*, 2017, 512.
[61] Ibid. 511.

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