The rapid rise and anti-climactic fall of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria has transformed extremist narratives, recruitment and propaganda patterns in South Asia. Furthermore, the diffusion of IS’ extremist narrative has galvanised a new generation of educated and urban militants who constitute the fourth generation South Asia jihadists preceded by the Afghan jihadists in the 1980s, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the 1990s and Al-Qaeda linked groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jandullah, among others, after 9/11. Using Peter Neumann’s New Terrorism Framework, this paper will explore the structure, methods, goals and ideological orientations of South Asia’s educated jihadists. Characteristically, the fourth generation of South Asia jihadists comprises of self-starters and freelancers who are moral consequentialist, tech savvy, overtly sectarian and decentralised. It will also explore whether the rise of South Asian educated jihadists is a novel phenomenon or continuation of old trends. The paper posits that the rise of educated jihadists in South Asia is the aftereffect of War on Terror as opposed to the aftereffect of Afghan Jihad which created different trends in the region.

The US­‐led liberal international order is going through a fundamental change with implications for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. President Trump’s ‘America First’ rhetoric combined with inconsistent and shifting US policy towards the region has meant that MENA countries have been increasingly looking to deepen their relationship with other international partners such as Russia, China and the European Union. This has been the case for Egypt, which has sought to increase its economic and security engagement with the European Union, amongst other partners. In an increasingly chaotic Southern Mediterranean region, the European Union has also looked towards Egypt as a stable and reliable partner to cooperate with in facing with many of the ongoing regional challenges. Based on a study conducted by the author for the European Parliament, this research examines some of the key drivers for EU – Egypt relations, and investigates its prospects and challenges over the next decades. The study argues that the EU’s economic and security engagement with Egypt should not come at the expense of supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The study also argues that EU programmatic assistance to Egypt should focus on youth, women, education, and entrepreneurship. Finally, the study also argues that the EU’s engagement is likely to be more successful if EU member states are more unified in their approach towards Egypt.

President Trump’s announcement of the United States’ recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel sparked wide international criticism and protest, and general approval in Israel. In response, the Palestinian Authority (PA) pushed to internationalize the moribund peace process by taking to the United Nations, and advocating for a multilateral international mechanism to replace the United States as the sole mediator. This paper explores the limitations of the PA’s internationalization strategy by shifting the focus from Israel and international actors, to the PA’s fiscal structure. By examining the evolution of the PA’s fiscal skeleton, this paper sets the ground for exploring links between the PA’s fiscal structure and foreign policy. Taking into account the absence of functional sovereignty, rentierism, and the PA’s revenue generation record, the paper utilizes a theoretical framework of fiscal sociology and international relations theory. Findings highlight that aid and indirect taxes, that are collected and processed by Israel (clearance revenue) on behalf of the PA, represent on average 80 percent of the PA’s total revenue. Furthermore, in recent years, a shifting fiscal dependency from aid toward clearance revenue and other indirect taxes controlled by Israel have dictated new parameters to the PA’s internationalization strategy.

Violent extremism has manifest in myriad ways over the past decades in Pakistan. In response, the Pakistan state and military have sought to counter this extremism through different strategies. However, these have been fraught with problems, and the violence continues, sometimes escalating with such agitations as those by Khadim Hussain Rizvi and his Tehreek Labbaik Pakistan in November 2017. More importantly, many non-state actors are engaging in various kinds of social negotiations and actions to lessen the violence and recapture indigenous cultural identity and religious values. This paper is part of a book project, Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan: Local Actions, Local Voices, and addresses one of many local efforts currently underway to counter violent extremism in Pakistan. Based on research conducted in Pakistan between 2017-19, it focuses on innovative ways that religious leaders and practitioners, throughout the country, are promoting interfaith harmony and mobilizing their constituencies and others in these efforts. These include efforts to mobilize communities in the event of an attack, to educate communities about other faiths, to revise syllabi at madrasas and other religious schools. The paper also questions the impact such efforts are having on countering extremism in Pakistan.

By far the understanding of religious fundamentalism in India has led to two extreme narratives, each looking at only that part of the picture that suits it. The popular and the state-centric view limit it to a security and law and order issue. At the other extreme, the individual religious fundamentalist groups project themselves as the ‘legitimate custodian’ of their respective religion; the violence used by them against other religion is often ‘justified’ through minority/majority status of the group. While these two narratives dominate the religious fundamentalism discourse in India it certainly fails to identify and engage with some subtle but important aspects such as the processes of legitimization and the evolvement of institutions around religious fundamentalism. Moving away from these two narratives the proposed paper seeks to engage with three important but least addressed aspects of religious fundamentalism in India. The process in which fundamentalism, across religious spectrum, operates is a major aspect that the paper seeks to engage with. In the last couple of decades, especially after the proscription of the Students’ Islamist Movement in India (SIMI) in 2001 and followed by the infamous Godhra riot in Gujarat in 2002; the nature of religious fundamentalism has been going under significant changes. Prior to these events activities around religious fundamentalism in India were largely confined to ‘reaction of a particular group against the action of the other’. However, the post Godhra riot period witnesses the processes of consolidation among the fundamentalist groups against each other. While the popular understandings often engage with the Hindu and Islamic fundamentalist groups the Christian fundamentalism, though in a lesser degree, has also grown substantially. One striking feature among these religious fundamentalist groups has been their flexibility in forging alliance with another with a motive to target what they perceive as a ‘common enemy’. The alliance between the Hindu and Christian radical groups against celebration of ‘ Tipu Jayanti’ in Indian state of Karnataka or the Popular Front of India (PFI), an Islamic radical organisation forging alliance with Christian radical groups, largely led by the Pentecostals, against the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) in Kerala are some examples. While these alliances are extremely localized in nature they do have significant impact larger processes of religious fundamentalism in India. A second major motive of this paper is to engage with the aspects of legitimization and representation that the fundamentalist groups operate with. Religious fundamentalism in India is increasingly seen to be functioning through legitimizing its activities. Fundamentalist groups across the religious lines enjoy certain degree of support and legitimacy from various civil societies and political dispensations. It will not be entirely wrong to say that religious fundamentalism is increasingly becoming an inseparable part of Indian party politics and there by enjoys legitimization. A least known Hindu radical group, Karni Sena’s, violent activities in most North-Indian states over a fictional character without any criticism by political parties is a testimony to this. At the same time religious fundamentalism in India is also observed to be closely interacting with other forms of extremism. Extremist groups like the Maoists closely interact Christian and Islamic radicals in states like Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and West Bengal. Similarly, the caste based extremist groups like Ranbir Sena and Karni Sena are seen to be closely interacting with the Hindu radicals. A third objective of this paper is to identify and engage with the institutions which are either established or influenced by the fundamentalist groups. Institutions created by the fundamentalist groups, both in terms of practices and norms and establishments (Rawls 1971, 1999, p. 47), help them sustain their activities.

A site of political conflict with a diverse demographic profile is rich ground for religious extremists to penetrate. The vertical and horizontal expansion of such extremism is phenomenally quick as it is nurtured by competitive extremism of two or more groups, xenophobia of one being a stimulant for the other. Jammu & Kashmir with its religious and ethnic diversity provides a perfect setting where Islamic extremism in the north and Hindu extremism in the south, despite being at logger heads, are perfect stimulants for each other. This paper explores the rise of competitive extremism in Jammu & Kashmir as a case study, looking at intersections of conflict with extremism and role of various agents and catalysts including state and non state actors in exacerbating communal divisions to the point that even incidents like rape and murder of a minor girl (Kathua, 2018) become rich cash crops in the hands of extremists for politicization and furthering the binaries of ‘us and them’. The region is not unfamiliar with divisive politics played by various stake-holders including the deep states of India and Pakistan in the last 70 years. At present, the ground is much more fertile for popular appeal of respective extremists.

Religiously motivated violence in the form of communal riots in India and sectarian violence in Pakistan has been a dominant factor inciting hate against the minorities. The new dynamics however now being experienced is the urban youth being mobilized in the name of religion , they are otherwise relatively educated, live in cities, practice religion and professionals. These young “normal” people find motivation following their leaders and indulge in committing acts of violence against the “other'”. In India, with the rise of BJP under Modi and the political space RSS Sanghis acquired has resulted in violent expression of their commitment to the cause of Hindutva. Pakistan on the other hand, while dealing militarily with the Taliban ( who happen to be Deobandis) ignored the fact that more larger population of urban youth following Braelvi school of thought has managed to acquire the social and political space. This has resulted in mass mobilization by the leaders of Sunni Braelvis in the cities in the name of Propher (PBUH). These young mobilized city dwellers proved to be extremely intolerant towards other sects and minorities particularly Ahmedis. In both countries, unlike old extremists, the new extremists prefer to participate in democratic politics and yet believe in violently convincing the other. The paper is significant to understand the changing dynamics of extremism in both countries that is weakening the democratic order of the post colonial South Asian states. It is also important as the threat is within and unlike traditional India-Pakistan conflict, it endorses the ideological hardening which makes both the states vulnerable to ideologically driven mass mobilization of young urban extremists , thus making it extremely difficult to establish peace in the region.

The May 2018 Parliamentary elections in Lebanon were touted as a landmark moment, not only because of the return of voting after nearly a decade of political paralysis, but also due to the introduction of a new proportional electoral law (Law No. 44). This new law, supported by the majority of Lebanon’s major parties, was hailed as key to overcoming the political gridlock through a move from bloc vote plurality to proportional representation. In addition, it was seen as a panacea to the dominance of Lebanon’s establishment parties and families. However, this paper will argue that Law No. 44 does not represent a fundamental, or even substantive, change to the Lebanese electoral system. Instead, it serves to further perpetuate the elite cartel model of governance that has defined the country’s politics since independence. Through an analysis of voting patterns and results as well as electoral financing, this paper will highlight the continuing patterns of exclusion of new parties and candidates, and the further reification of politics in Lebanon around the 6 establishment parties.

In his presentation, Dr Ben Rich, a researcher of Saudi Arabian politics, will discuss recent developments in Saudi foreign policy and their wider implications for regional security. In particular, he will focus on the historically divergent bellicosity of the Salman administration under the auspices of Prince Mohammad Bin Salman. Of particular note have been a number of developments in the past three years, including the unprecedented GCC military intervention into Yemen, the artificially orchestrated Qatari diplomatic crisis, and the kidnapping of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri. In each instance, the Saudis have displayed a worrying tendency towards recklessness that has generated numerous unforeseen and destabilising consequences for the Gulf region.

This paper considers the US policy on recognising Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the opening of the US embassy on the occasion of the establishment of the State of Israel. More importantly, it plots the way in which the Trump administration engaged the subject in opening the embassy, noting areas of contention and policy imperatives. The timing of the move in terms of such actions as that of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Iran atomic files expose is also considered. US congressional debates leading up to the issue of recognition, and Trump’s own specific response to the issue, are also considered, suggesting that the picture, as ever, is more complex than it seems.

This paper analyses the external involvement of regional and major powers in Kurdish separatism in Iraq and Iran. It is argued that the Kurdish cause has been used as a proxy for clashes between international actors in the Middle East for a long period of time and the current situation resembles this historical trend. The paper is separated in three parts. Part one analytically distinguishes the motives of external involvement into instrumental reasons on the one hand and affective reasons on the other. Instrumental motives are international political considerations, short-term and long-term economic motives, domestic motives and short-term military gains. Affective involvement includes reasons of justice, humanitarian considerations, ethnic, religious or ideological affinity. Part two, analyses the Kurdish struggle as a proxy during the Cold War and until the creation of the Iraqi Federal Government with reference to the involvement of major powers as well as regional actors. Part three analyses recent developments of Kurdish separatism in Iraq and Iran in light of the 2017 referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan and well as the recent hardening of US foreign policy in the region.

Sri Lanka’s transition from civil war to peace has been conflated with the rise of religious extremism and neo-nationalism. Buddhism is the dominating religion in Sri Lanka with about 70% of the people following Theravada Buddhism, followed by 16% Hindus, 8% Islam and about 8% Christians. While Sinhala Buddhism was favoured by the state in the past when “the Sinhala Only Act” of 1956 made Sinhala the official language of the country, at present, there has been a forceful resurgence of Buddhist religious nationalism, which has been inherently violent. The recent rise of radical and, at times, violent religious movements led by Buddhist organisations including Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) has resulted in racial and faith-based hatred and violence primarily against Muslim but also Christian minorities communities. Focusing on the resurgence of Sinhala Buddhist ideology and contentious political mobilisation in Sri Lanka, this paper critically examines why and under what circumstances countries emerging from armed conflicts experience the rise of religious extremism and neo-nationalist discourse and what impact it will have on inter-religious co-existence. The findings presented in this paper are drawn from interviews conducted in northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka between March and June 2018.

In the twilight of the twentieth century communal violence in India began to acquire a sharpened political salience. In response, social scientists sought to emphasise the syncretic character of many Indian intercommunal interactions. Highlighting sharing and synthesis within folk religious traditions, these scholars rejected the communal logic fast colouring Indian public debate. While a powerful rebuke to communal antagonism, this work has not explored how syncretism can also be a tool of communal of division. Who syncretises? Who is syncretised? How does Indian syncretism reflect power differentials between Hindu and Muslim communities? In this paper I argue that syncretic discourses can be shrewdly manufactured by instrumentalist political brokers seeking to publically legitimise communal activities. Drawing on my fieldwork in New Delhi with the Muslim Rashtriya Manch, the Muslim wing of the militantly Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), I explore how religious syncretism can operate in the service of violent religious extremists. By examining how the RSS promotes Islamisation of Hindu nationalist theology among Manch members, I critique the uncritical placement of religious extremism within orthodox religious traditions. When we question this placement, we can begin to realise the reactionary and conservative potential of religious syncretism in India.

In June 2014, one third of Iraqi territory – including Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city – fell under ISIS control, which represented a major threat to Iraq’s existence as a united nation-state. However, despite ending this threat, and taking measures against the ramifications of the Kurdistan referendum for independence in October 2017, serious challenges are still overshadowing Iraq’s future. Iraq remains a contested field for the Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry, and for the looming conflict between Israel and Iran, especially following Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. This paper analyses the results of the 2018 Iraqi election, as an indicator of which pathway Iraq is heading towards: ethno-sectarianism or strengthening its overarching national identity. selections of media interviews for political leaders of the main election coalitions representing the main communal and cross-communal groups, are analysed using discourse analysis in relation to their national sentiments. The election results indicate significant breaches of the ethno-sectarian political framework that dominated the Iraqi political scene since 2003. The election results of the examined political alliances are interpreted to detect the future directions of Iraq’s internal dynamics, and the regional implications of these dynamics.

Why did Qatar support the opposition Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) in the Syrian uprising? Existing literature describes Qatar’s foreign policy as a textbook example of hedging, i.e. to pursue opposing positions in order to reduce risk. However, hedging does not adequately explain Qatar’s significant support for the SMB in the early stages of the Syrian uprising. Another possible explanation might be that Qatar and the SMB share a similar worldview. However, though Qatar supports the SMB, the MB in Egypt, and Hamas in Palestine, Qatar does not share in these movements’ revivalist interpretation of Islam. In contrast, Qatar shares in Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi doctrine. In the proposed paper, I will argue that Qatar acted as a rational political actor in its support for the SMB. In doing so, I will show that Qatar, as president of the Arab League, succeeded in rallying Arab support for actions against Libya and Syria that resonated with the Western-led international community, and that (for a limited time) the SMB succeeded in presenting its moderate policy on governance as a plausible alternative to Bashar al-Asad’s one-party state.

This paper studies the position, role and importance of sub-state actors in the Trump government’s foreign policy, with a focus on the Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria. Specifically, the paper investigates the role of the sub-state Kurdish forces located in Iraq and Syria as leverage and/or as the implementers of the policy defined by the US in the Middle East. In Iraq, Kurds , on the one hand, have played political-military roles in counter-terrorism initiatives against IS and, on the other hand, the US has been strengthening these Kurdish Iraqi forces to provide leverage to challenge Baghdad’s increasingly pro-Shia domestic and foreign policy. In Syria, the political forces of the Syrian Kurds and their joint military forces with their Arab allies, known as the SDF, have played an important role as an element of US foreign policy in the fight against the terrorism of radical Islamists, and now SDF is acting as the implementer of US foreign policy in Syria. This paper will argue that the Kurds have become a more important actor due to US support and have an important role in foreign policy of the US.

Establishing and promoting the rule of law and democracy in the Middle East has been an ongoing strategy both within and outside the Middle East for many decades. One important element of the rule of law, as well as a democratic system in any country, is an independent judiciary where the rights of people are protected and the power of the government is confined to the Constitution and the legal system. While in countries based on a democracy, in Europe, Australia, and elsewhere, independent judiciaries protect the rule of law against political pressures. In most Middle Eastern countries, there is no well-established and effective judicial system to protect civil rights and to control political powers and pressures. There are, however, working legal systems, separation of power to some degree, and some important theoretical bases for independent judiciaries. This paper will first analyse the importance of independent judiciaries in systems based on the rule of law and democracy. This paper will then review the status of judicial independence in the Middle East, particularly in major countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. It will be suggested that the tradition of independence of the institution of law and the independence of judicial systems and judges must be promoted in the Middle East in order to establish effective legal systems based on the rule of law.

President Barak Obama’s decision to abstain in UNSC Resolution 2334 (23 December 2016) marked a turning point in American diplomacy towards the Middle East. Not only did Washington’s stance effectively reiterate the validity of U.N. Res 242 (1967) —centrally, the illegality of the Israeli occupation and settlement building in the territories captured during the Six-Day War,— it also appeared to constitute a departure from the customary trilateralist negotiating template —bilateral Arab-Israeli talks, unilaterally overseen by the U.S.— characterising peace efforts since the Camp David summit hosted by Jimmy Carter in 1978. This paper argues that these developments, enacted on the eve of the transition of power from Obama to the president-elect, Donald Trump (a figure already touched by controversy after a presidential campaign promise to move the American embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem), have not only laid down the foreign policy-making gauntlet for the incoming Republican administration, but defined the changing political contours of U.S. identity towards the Mideastern region. Moreover, the paper explores how the U.S. shift might be perceived in the historical framework of Woodrow Wilson when compared with the directness of Trump by its global allies and opponents alike.

Upon his election Donald Trump announced his ambitious initiative, the Deal of the Century, to solve the Palestine/Israel conflict once and for all. Although the parameters of Trump’s deal are not clearly discernable, the geopolitical shifts in the region made it possible for his administration to exercise the utmost pressure on the Palestinians to force them to accept whatever is on offer. In this context, even the usually compliant Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas called Trump’s deal ‘the slap of the century. In this paper, I look at the implications of, and reactions to, Trump’s two major decisions in relation to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict: the decision to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem and the cutting of funding to UNRWA. I argue that the two decisions aim to dissolve the Palestinian question rather than solve it. In this sense the decisions are a continuation of a long history of failed attempts to diminish and side-step the Palestinian people. In the current instance, the bluntness of Trump’s approach, combined with the changing geopolitical circumstances, have undercut the normative and conceptual framework that has underpinned Palestinian political moves since the early 1970s. The question that remains is, will the American pressure drive the Palestinians to come up with their own creative solutions, as they did in their successive uprisings, or drive them to despair?

The Sunni population of Iran is geographically dispersed and ethnically diverse. However, since the 1990s, a number of political entrepreneurs have attempted to create a Sunni bloc in the Iranian parliament to lobby for Sunni causes. These MPs have primarily, but not exclusively, been of Kurdish origin, although they have directly tried to reach other to other Sunni groups, particularly Turkmen, Baluch and Lari people. In this way, they have tried to create a sense of Sunni-ness which crosses ethnic, geographic, class and religious differences. The Iranian government has approached this movement with caution, at times arresting its activists when they are deemed to cross red lines, while at other times placing heavy restrictions on its members. In this paper, I will examine the phenomenon through three main case studies: the activism of former MP Jalal Jalalizadeh, and the unofficial spiritual leadership of Maulavi Abdolhamid Esmailzahi, and the discourse around the growth of Salafism in some Sunni districts.

This paper will explore three elements of Iraq’s domestic security challenge to demonstrate the centrality of counterinsurgency in ensuring stability and political and social development under its new administration. Firstly, the importance of continuing to pursue ISIS and ISIS-sympathetic groups to ensure that “ISIS 2.0” does not develop. It will discuss the popular problematic perspective of “ISIS 2.0” in relation to the group’s shift to regular insurgency terror tactics: this is not “ISIS 2.0”, but rather “ISIS Classic”. Misunderstanding this reality risks increased insurgent strength and activity under the noses of Iraqi forces. Secondly, to protect against insurgent growth, a concerted effort is required within schools. Militant groups have much to gain through control of school infrastructure and students, and influence of educational curricula (previously used by ISIS for long-term ideological influence and child recruitment). Multi-level coordination is required to ensure curricula are informed by principles of tolerance and inclusion, that community-led awareness programs for youth radicalisation are established, and that schools are protected. Failure risks undermining community cohesion, security, and fragmentation as seen during the early 2010s. Thirdly, engagement with regional and foreign powers is essential for protecting against cross-border insurgent activities. The Iraqi government must priorities border protection and preparedness. Coordination with neighbours and utilisation of foreign assets such as US intelligence and logistical support should be prioritised to limit cross-border insurgent activities. Doing so starves armed groups of logistical strategic options. Failure risks decreased confidence in the government’s counterinsurgency abilities, resulting in vigilante violence, arms trafficking and other destabilising activities

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic and multi religious country. Country’s foundation rests on the two nation theory. Therefore, it has an impact on the post-independence state and society of Pakistan. Religion assumes significance in Pakistan’s state and society. It has exhibited in Pakistan’s foreign policy, which describes developing cordial relations with brotherly Islamic countries. This state promotion of religion, especially since the 1979 after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has a profound impact on Pakistan. External interference in Pakistani society increased, resulting in proxy wars/proxies that lead to violent religious extremism. Therefore, last two decades of 20th century exclusively revolved around sectarian war between Shiite and Deobandi sects. Though, Pakistan has managed to curtail terrorism through excessive military operations, yet, the country seems far away from effectively dealing against extremism in the society. Barelvi sect of Islam consists majority of Muslim population in the country. It associates itself with peaceful Sufism. However, recently this sect has started showing assertiveness through various audacious acts. The sect is hyper sensitive on the issues of blasphemy and finality of Prophethood. Barelvi clergy has started organizing itself and established a political party known as Tehreek Labaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA) in order to protect their religious interests. Their sentiments of extreme aggression against political elite can be witnessed in assassination of Governor Punjab, incident of violent sit-ins, assassination attempt of Interior Minister, etc. However, due to the religious sensitivity of the issue state response towards many such incidents is naive. This paper is an attempt to highlight the significance of this emerging phenomenon in Pakistan. The paper revolves around two basic questions: Why the rise of Barelvi extremism took place and how it can affect Pakistan? The paper assumes that rise of Barelvi extremism in Pakistan may resurrect violent sectarianism in Pakistan. Being a political group it may likely find further leverage in state and society to persecute Ahmadis.

Since the 2011 Arab uprisings there has been an increased interest in examining how the effects of climate change may affect the Middle East region. The World Bank has declared the region one of the most vulnerable to drought and rising temperatures. Energy security will be a key issue, with some predicting a decline in fossil fuel demand over the next decades. Likewise states in the region face severe water scarcity, dependency on agricultural imports, political corruption and authoritarianism, a youth bulge and rising youth unemployment, civil wars, terrorism, and geopolitical tensions. This paper will argue that climate change effects must be included in risk assessments of the region in the coming decades, presenting unique challenges for the Trump Administration. The lack of a clear US strategy when it comes to the region, and President Trump’s denial of climate change, suggest that these risks will not be given adequate attention. This has troubling implications as energy security, food and water security, and political and social stability are all interconnected. Each of these systems in the Middle East region is under increasing strain and a failure or collapse in any one system could have a cascade effect across the region.

Islamic revolution of Iran was a reaction to secularization of the Shah regime and an attempt at de-secularization of the society and the state. After four decades of striving towards an Islamic polity, however, the Islamic state in Iran has given rise to an Islam which is secular at its foundations. Ontologically, it is based on a world without God and His intervention. Its universe has the same entities as other secular conceptions of the world. The natural and material forces are the master drivers of the world and casualty is understood scientifically. At the end of the chain of casualty there is only a deistic ultimate cause. No supernatural entities are considered ‘really’ instrumental in the nature and thus, they are not accounted in the everyday calculations and planning of the state. This cosmology is purely materialistic and worldly. In this paper, I will argue how the revolution has unwantedly gave rise to this secular worldview and helped to un-do the old conceptions of an active, all-encompassing, and omnipotent God by focusing on the theories of the most important thinker of the revolution Murtaza Motahhari.

The emerging literature in the field of rebel governance offers many interesting insights into how and why armed groups with statebuilding aspirations use violence, develop institutions of governance and seek legitimacy through diplomacy. While notable research has discussed many important aspects of rebel diplomacy and legitimacy, scholars working in this field have not yet focused on the knock-on affects the involvement of armed rebel groups in ceasefire negotiations has on their legitimacy and the ramifications of this for local governance efforts. This article fills this gap by examining how the Astana negotiations in 2017 for a ceasefire in Syria affected the legitimacy of a number of rebel groups. Focusing on the dynamics of the negotiation process that led to the announcement of four de-escalation zones, the project draws on interviews with members of Syrian opposition groups involved in negotiations, literature in the field of rebel governance and diplomacy, policy documents and media reports. I argue that for armed groups with statebuilding aspirations, ceasefires signed in international fora such as Astana offer an important opportunity to insert themselves into international politics and the state-based system. However, perceived international legitimacy can also create ruptures between groups at the local level thereby influencing their use of violence against each other and civilians as well as the development of governance structures.

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the United States (US), and by extension Western policy on Syria, was tentative, unclear and seemed to change course over the course of seven-year conflict. Their primary counterpart Russia on the other hand has followed an open and consistent policy: declare Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime the legitimate government of Syria, always support his regime to ensure it doesn’t collapse, and morally justify its involvement as a struggle against terrorism. Under Barack Obama’s administration, the US consistently stayed out of direct involvement in the Syrian conflict. Busy with the Iraq exit, Obama missed the window of diplomatic opportunity in the crucial early months of the Syrian uprising in 2011. When violence started, Obama elected to provide limited military support to opposition groups, hoping they could muster enough power to dismantle Assad without success. Trump opted for a more active policy but restricted it to the elimination of ISIS in Syria and supporting Kurdish YPG forces. Yet in April 2018 Trump declared US would pull out of Syria. This paper will chart the series of events and the US actions and announcements related to Syria to uncover US policy shifts and uncertainties in Syria before and during Trump era.

Israel and Saudi Arabia (KSA) have had no official diplomatic relations since the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948. KSA has not only participated in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973, but also has refused to recognize the state of Israel, continued backing Palestinian rights to sovereignty, and demanded that Israel withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in 1967. In 2009, KSA rejected U.S. pleas to improve ties with Israel reiterating that the core issues: “the border of a future Palestinian state, the fate of refugees, water disputes and the future of Jerusalem” must be fully resolved as preconditions. Despite unfulfilled preconditions, the two states disclosed the onset of diplomatic linkages in 2015. The growing alignment between two unlikely allies, endorsed by Trump admin, begs the question: what put the two enemies on the path towards alliance? In this paper I use Role theory and method of narrative analysis to examine how KSA and Israel, the two members of a dyad (ego-alter), continued to stay in a conflictual relation before 2015 sudden reorientation. Then I argue that the strategic interaction in the process of role location created a limited state of détente between KSA and Israel, hence their reorientation.

In Pakistan women’s social reality is a complex one, mediated by multiple elements outside the mainstream political and social framework. Since the last one and a half decades women have been exploited in the name of religion. The religious extremist fervor has brought a fundamental change in the outlook, behavior and thinking of certain group of women in urban Pakistan on one hand. This group of women instead of using religion for a positive social change is using it for furthering differences and dissentions on narrow lines of piety, fundamentalism, sectarianism. On the other, in certain regions of Pakistan, violent extremist groups attacked women, imposed limits on their dress, mobility, freedom of expression, stopped girls from attending schools, and have created a deep resentment as well confusion amongst the women. Keeping in view the saying of Holy Prophet, “be aware of extremism in religion, for it destroyed those before you”, the paper would discuss: how some radicalized women try to affect social change as per their narrow agenda; how other women suffer at the hands of extremist groups in certain regions of Pakistan; and explaining women, violent extremism and social change within the context of Pakistan.

Since the 2001 US-led military intervention, Afghanistan has experienced an upsurge in old and new forms of identity politics. While the country continues to be seen by many either through the prism of colonial era tribal and conservative politics or more recent conceptions of power rivalries among the country’s major ethnic groups, smaller ethno-cultural groups have also embarked on processes of redefining their collective identities, challenging the dominant narratives and categories and creating new forms of collective identities and belongings. This paper will seek to shed light on this process through a detailed study of an ongoing effort at redefinition of a new ethno-religious identity: the Sunni Hazaras of Afghanistan. Focusing on the National Council of the Sunni Hazaras of Afghanistan, it will explore how a new generation of activists seek to carve out a new identity between the predominantly Shia and historically-marginalised Hazaras on the one hand, and the predominantly Sunni and Farsi speaking Tajiks, on the other. Drawing on extended field work and interviews with with Sunni Hazara activists, the paper will explore how the roles of religion, language, and myths of origin change as markers of collective identities as they interact with broader processes of institutional and social change in contemporary Afghanistan.

Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s speech at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution on January 17, 2018 outlined what he deemed to be US policy toward the Syrian war. He indicated that Washington is not contemplating a military withdrawal from Syria. Defense Secretary James Mattis had indicated earlier too that the United States cannot repeat prior mistakes it made in Iraq; the early withdrawal of US troops allowed extremist and fundamentalist groups to exploit conditions in the country, which led to the establishment of a “caliphate” there by the so-called Islamic State (IS). But weeks after that and soon after Trump fired his Secretary of State Mr. Tillerson, Trump announced he will his troops from Syria in a contradiction to what his secretary of State and defense said. This is only one indication to the disarray of the Trump policy going through in Syria. This is apply too to his decision to strike the Syrian regime twice after the use of chemical weapon in Idlib in 2017 and then in Douma in April 2018, Trump gave a decision of a limited response twice but never though he needs to develop a strategy in Syria after the strikes which makes Tillerson’s speech no more than a Wishlist. The US president thus knows that there is an urgent need for an American strategy in Syria after Raqqa, one that takes into account the security, military, and political aspects of the conflict instead of concentrating only on single pinprick operations like he did twice in 2017 and again in 2018. Unfortunately, however, the administration does not seem to understand the negative repercussions from the absence of a comprehensive strategy—in the past and present. Instead, the United States has focused its efforts on defeating IS and neglected the need to have a political solution, the US approach of arming and supporting the YPG may allow the Kurds to try to secede, which, in turn, would lead to the dismemberment of the country. This contradicts the administration’s stated goal of preserving Syria’s unity and territorial integrity.

Salafism has received scrutiny as the main ideological source for violent extremism propagated by jihadi groups. However, Salafism is not a monolith: it contains numerous streams. An understanding of all such streams is crucial to understanding the socio-political dynamics of Muslim societies that Salafism influences. Besides Salafi jihadis—those who sanction violence—there are two other broad trends of Salafism: quietist and activist. Quietist Salafis endorse an apolitical tradition. Activist Salafis advocate peaceful political change. Each stream is led by ‘ulama, seen as the preservers of Salafi traditions.

This paper will exam the resurgence of Sinhalese Buddhist extremist groups in Sri Lanka and how these groups exploit social media to spread Islamphobia and incite violence. Recent attacks against Muslim minorities in the towns of Kandy and Ampara were triggered in part by hate speech filled social media posts spread by groups such as Bodu Bala Sena (otherwise known as BBS or Buddhist power force.) Since the end of the Sri Lankan Civil War in 2009 there has been an increase in support for Sinhalese Buddhist extremist groups who have targeted Muslim minorities. Groups such as BBS have adopted the rhetoric and language of the global anti-Muslim movement which has gained increased momentum in South Asia. Debate around the place that Sinhala Buddhism holds within Sri Lanka and the fears that it is under threat by Muslim minorities is at the heart of understanding the recent attacks and the rise in popularity of groups such as BBS. Sinhala-Buddhist extremist groups such as BBS have large followings on Facebook and recent polling results in the 2015 parliamentary elections in which the BBS political wing received a small proportion of the vote suggests that such groups are gaining mainstream appeal and consolidating political influence. The spread of an anti-Muslim narrative through social media platforms is a fairly new phenomenon and this paper seeks to explore the motivations for this institutionalised Islamophobia by examining how social media has been weaponised by groups such as BBS and Sinhala Ravaya.

Using two forms of input and output legitimacy, this paper examines the United States’ state-building approach in Afghanistan following the 2001 intervention. The sitting government in Kabul, which was established on the basis of an obscure power-sharing model that was designed through the direct mediation of former Secretary of State John Kerry, is yet to achieve any substantial form of legitimacy since its establishment in 2014. The terms of the previous government under President Karzai were no better. This prompts this paper to evaluate the extent to which the absence of governmental legitimacy can be traced to the interventions of the international community, especially the United States. It argues that the Afghan government’s perennial paralysis and legitimacy deficit is largely due to the United States’ unclear approach in Afghanistan and the region. It suggests that a more inclusive political paradigm that reflects the socio-political realities of Afghanistan, rather than a paternalistic short-term westerns vision, is key to achieving governmental legitimacy.

This year, as Palestinians commemorated 70 years of dispossession and erasure, news networks broadcasted on split screens footage on one side of thousands of unarmed Palestinians protestors in Gaza being met with Israeli live fire, while on the other, American and Israeli elites dressed in designer labels and drinking Champaign, celebrating the opening of the US embassy in Jerusalem. The stark contrast between the two realities left many wondering what will be next for Palestinians and Israelis, especially given the presence of the amalgamation of absolute power, and the absence of strong international bodies able and willing to enforce basic International Law and human rights. This paper will address the possible outcomes of Trump’s aggressive policies in regard to Israel/Palestine and will make recommendations as to what needs to be done in order to ensure a future where Israelis and Palestinian can finally have a peace with justice, freedom and dignity for all.

The relationship between Al-Shabaab and its foreign fighters has been tumultuous, with periods of active recruitment followed by rifts and purges. This paper will seek to provide context to this relationship by considering the tactics, targeting and recruitment strategies of Al-Shabaab between 2006 – 2017. By exploring the recruitment trends that Al-Shabaab have exhibited during this timeframe, as well as the contribution of Al-Shabaab foreign fighters throughout this period, the paper offers some hypotheses as to why the flow of foreign fighters has been inconsistent. This paper engages with the existing body of foreign fighter research, as well as primary source material released by Al-Shabaab, including its official social media posts and its English language magazine. This article argues that the flow of foreign fighters to Somalia between 2006 – 2017 was erratic, with stages of significant foreign fighter entry followed by low recruitment levels and the mass exit or, in some cases, forced removal of foreign fighters from the organisation. This article identifies some of the factors that influenced these recruitment shifts and will build on the growing body of work on foreign fighters.

Policy and academic analysis of militancy and extremism in Pakistan predominantly focuses on the actions of terrorists, and the counter-insurgency moves made by the government. Such focus ignores the fact that the process of radicalisation and extremism is closely intertwined with narratives that potential and existing supporters of militant organisations are exposed to on a consistent basis. The main strategists of these organisations, the narrators, construct stories (narrations) that encourage the audience (potential and existing recruits) to undertake actions designed to achieve an ideal state (the end result of struggle). The narratives are not independent of the national and international context and can shift as the preferences of the narrators change due to a multiplicity of factors. The narratives of Jamaatud Dawah on jihad and social welfare present a clear picture of altered goals, and actions required of supporters of the group. Hafiz Saeed as the main ideologue and leader of JuD, occupies a significant position in this respect. His discussion of the need to engage in jihad, identification of those responsible for this struggle, and the kind of struggle needed has both reflected and shaped the narratives of JuD. This paper will explore the shifting contours of his views on jihad, and by extension participation in the social welfare space, by comparing the ideas presented in Tafsir Surah Tauba, Tafsir Syrah Yusuf and Khutbaat-t-Qadasiyya. The paper will aim to demonstrate that the narratives of jihad have shifted as the regional and global context has changed for Pakistan with it gradually being isolated by the United States. The paper will also explore the implications of the altered narratives for JUD’s participation in the political space in Pakistan.

The number of US counter-terrorism airstrikes roughly doubled between 2016 and US President Trump’s first year in office in 2017 – an upward trend that looks likely to continue. The question of whether such strikes (mostly conducted using drones) reduce either the number or intensity of terrorist incidents is one of the biggest debates in terrorism studies today. One side of the debate highlights the ability of the strikes to disrupt the organisational capacity of terrorist groups, thereby limiting their ability to do harm. The other emphasises the civilian casualties and delegitimisation of local governments the strikes can cause, both of which may drive radicalisation and thus ‘blowback’ on the United States and its allies. Understandably, both sides attempt to quantify the number and nature of the casualties (civilians or militants) as evidence of their strategic in/effectiveness as a counter-terrorism tool. However, both sides tend to draw contrasting conclusions from similar evidence. Statistical studies also seem to show that airstrikes could either increase or decrease the threat of terrorism. This paper explores what we can – and cannot – know about the counter-terrorism effects of airstrikes, and asks what not knowing means for Trump’s air wars?

US foreign policy towards the Middle East, and the Islamic world more generally, has tended to favour radical Islamists over secular governments. This is in direct contrast to the public face of US diplomacy which has long been cast as an existential struggle against radical Islamists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan and elsewhere. This paper explains why the US favours radical Islamists wherever it can and what this tells us about the driving forces behind US foreign policy in the region and beyond.

To represent their interests, the Kurds organised political groups to address all their cultural and political grievances. While the plurality of political groups each claim to facilitate this objective and represent the will of the Kurds, their numerous disagreements highlight their ideological disparities which frequently contradict each other and, subsequently, the actual demands and desires of the Kurds. As their ideological divide has grown, the wider international impact of the animosity between the groups has caused further consternation for the Kurdish community. The support, indifference, or vehemence the groups have faced are often a result of the complex nature of their internal relationships. To ascertain the levels of support these groups enjoy throughout the Kurdish diaspora, numerous interviews were conducted. After examining the common themes and arguments prevalent throughout the interviews, the political groups’ effectiveness and levels of support can be gauged. The results of this research make it possible to ascertain how accurate the politic groups’ claims are and how closely the Kurdish community’s expectations of these groups links with the rhetoric of the groups. It also allows insight into how the Kurdish diaspora thinks the groups can improve to better represent their constituents.

Bangladesh, the third largest Muslim country of the world, is beginning to be depicted as a hub for Islamist militancy which is attracting media as well as academic examination. Yet Islamic militancy is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh. Indeed, a number of Islamic militant groups that have been operating in Bangladesh since the mid-1990s. Islamic Militants are reported to have killed around 156 people in the country between March 1999 and January 2005. On 17 August 2005, the country was deeply shocked by a series of 459 bomb attacks that took place in 63 out of 64 districts of the country. Islamic militancy clearly exerts an obvious and present danger to Bangladesh. The latest attack at the Holy Artisan Café, which killed at least 20 foreigners in the diplomatic zone of the capital Dhaka on 1 July of 2016, and a failed attack, just six days after the café attack, which killed 2 people (including one police at Kishorganj district outside Dhaka, bear testimony to the presence of Daesh and the severity of the militant challenge in Bangladesh. This study uses qualitative research methods to explore how Bangladesh has become fertile ground for Daesh’s recruitment and who have been radicalized and how. It seeks to examine how Daesh is impacting on and exploiting religious beliefs, which religious groups are being targeted and in its efforts/strategies towards the recruitment of members – how is Daesh’s religious message distinct from other militant organisations in Bangladesh.

Islamophobia and the rise of Trump-ism is most commonly understood to be a problem that only impacts Muslim minorities living in Western countries, and is a symptom of media’s role in spreading of negative views about Muslims and Islam. This paper argues that Islamophobia is not simply about how Muslims are portrayed but is implicated in the broader crisis of post-Cold War liberal order that Trump represents. Our paper addresses question of the relationship between liberalism (and neo-liberalism), Islamophobia, and the new imperial assault on, and machinations in, the Middle East. We examine the relationship between between the Trumpian discourse of ‘take our country back’, the post-Cold war liberal political order, and how this has affected Trump’s war cabinet’s assault on what Noam Chomsky has called the US’s “most strategic prize in world history”: the Middle East. Our paper examines the intellectual and political resources and possibilities that now exist for imagining the Western liberal order in contravention of the Islamophobic assault on the Islamicate world. In this light we also examine the presence of the non-white, culturally unassimilable, rights bearing subject as a political problem for western liberalism. Finally, we interrogate the relationship between neo-liberal economic policies, the Western-supported authoritarian autocracies of the Middle Eastern region, and the ongoing deployment of vulgar neo-orientalism and Islamophobia.

The BJP was elected in 2014 with hopes for a development oriented socio-economic agenda and a robust foreign policy, yet, soon after the election the fear and apprehensions regarding its Hindu nationalist ideology resurfaced. Cultural nationalism calling for the revival of a Hindu nation has had significant ramifications for the non-Hindu populations in India and instances of Hindutva influence are evident in institutional appointments, free rein to radical groups and an increase in violence against religious minorities in India under the guise of cow vigilantism and religious conversions. The party and its associated Hindu nationalist groups have benefited from the strong parliamentary position and in addition to the traditional print and TV mediums that have reflected a strong bias towards these policies, social media is now a crucial method for propaganda. The BJP’s election campaign itself relied heavily on social media to promote the party’s message and present an acceptable and often exaggerated image of its leaders, particularly Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Since 2014, social media has become an active tool to deepen polarisation and spread misinformation campaigns about religious minorities and their disregard for “Hindu” traditions and values. This paper will highlight the increase in religious extremism in India since 2014, focusing specifically on the political use and abuse of social media in propagating and intensifying religious differences.

In 2014, ISIS’ atrocities against Yezidis in northern Iraq, and its advance on the Syrian-Kurdish enclave of Kobani, prodded the reluctant Obama administration into action in the Middle East. Using Kurdish fighters as proxies against ISIS saved the US from committing boots on the ground, but shifted the geopolitical terrain in favour of certain non-state actors in northern Syria and Iraq. This paper examines the emergence of Kurdish, Yezidi and Assyrian non-state actors in recent years and how they figure within US foreign policy. As state control diminished amid war and political disruption, Kurdish and other ethnopolitical actors capitalised on circumstances to advance their own causes and entrench their political projects during the international campaign against ISIS. Analysing these dynamics, this paper assesses whether these non-state actors were viewed by the US as proxies or as long-term allies. US support extended to military hardware but little political support. Regional states Turkey and Iraq have now reasserted their dominance at the expense of minorities – Yazidis in Sinjar and Kurds in Kirkuk – while the US has taken a back seat. The fate of minority political actors remains uncertain, subject to the vagaries of US policy in the region.

In international spaces, organisations and discourse, there is an increasing emphasis on the role of women in peace-building efforts. This is in part due to the UN Security Council Resolution 1325. UNSCR1325 (and 7 subsequent resolutions constituting the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda) emphasise the importance of the presence of women in post-conflict recovery. In turn, this emphasis shapes the projects, funding and framing of the relationship between international organisations (particularly UN affiliated bodies) and local civil society. Civil society organisations (CSOs) are often tasked with implementing development, humanitarian and other peace-building projects funded by international organisations and donors. This paper draws on PhD research on women’s civil society organising in Iraq to examine local-global relationships and how they affect women’s participation in peace building on the ground. Using key informant interviews and primary source material from Iraqi CSOs, this paper analyses examples of local civil society projects to illustrate the strength and limitations of women’s organising in the post-2003 Iraqi context. These examples provide insight into the struggles that local actors face in negotiating both global and local expectations about Iraq’s future and the role women can play in that future.

This paper utilises framing theory and the Peace Journalism model as evaluative criteria to empirically analyse how Al Jazeera Arabic (AJA) and Al Jazeera English (AJE) covered Bahrain’s uprising during the Saudi-led military intervention from March 14th to June 1st 2011. The quantitative findings conclude that the news stories and features of both channels were dominated by War Journalism framing. However, AJE presented Peace Journalism frames and characteristics more than AJA. This paper indicates that the absence and low percentages of Peace, People, Solution and Truth-Orientated frames in AJA have led to the promotion of sectarian narratives, representing Bahrain’s protests as a special case that does not relate to the Arab Spring uprisings and neglecting protesters’ peaceful means as well as their calls for unity between Shias and Sunnis. On the other hand, AJE’s critical representation of the Saudi military intervention and the moderate presence of Peace Journalism criteria in its coverage have made it stronger than AJA in challenging sectarian narratives and propaganda. This paper draws on the AJE-produced documentary film, Shouting in the Dark as a model that reflects how ‘reflexivity’ and Peace Journalism orientations are able to create a more accurate framing of the conflict.

At the time of his election, many Kurds appeared surprisingly optimistic regarding President Trump and his new administration. They appeared to hope that a President expressly intending to upend “the establishment”, “international conventions” and “the status quo,” might likewise prove willing to upend longstanding American policy towards the establishment of one or more independent Kurdish states. To what extend and under which possible scenarios might a Trump-led United States significantly break with past U.S. policies towards the Kurds? How would support for Kurdish aspirations in one part of Kurdistan impact policies towards the other parts of Kurdistan and the states these areas are located in?